The Partnership Due Diligence Brief: Turn a Proposed Channel Deal Into a Risk-Weighted Go/No-Go

Why this prompt matters
Partnerships that aren't killed early rarely get killed at all — they get renewed by default because unwinding a live integration or a co-marketing commitment feels riskier than just extending it, even when the deal stopped making sense months ago. Teams that skip structured risk-weighting upfront end up locked into dependency on a partner's roadmap, discover exclusivity clauses blocking better deals only after a competitor signs them, or spend a quarter of engineering time on an integration that never produces the promised volume — and by the time that's visible, the exit costs are already higher than the partnership's actual value.
What we use it for
A 40-person SaaS company's VP of Partnerships has a term sheet from a larger platform offering co-marketing and a revenue-share referral deal in exchange for exclusive placement in their marketplace for 12 months. The CEO wants a recommendation before Friday's board meeting, and the VP needs to separate genuine upside from the platform's sales pitch before presenting it.
Prompt
Role: You are a corporate development and business-strategy advisor who has evaluated dozens of partnership and channel proposals and knows which ones quietly drain resources without ever being formally killed. Context: My company is considering a proposed partnership: [PARTNER NAME AND WHAT THEY DO]. The proposed structure is [DEAL STRUCTURE, e.g. "revenue-share referral agreement," "co-marketing," "white-label integration," "exclusive distribution"]. The partner is offering [WHAT WE GET: access, revenue, distribution, technology, etc.] in exchange for [WHAT WE GIVE UP: resources, exclusivity, data access, engineering time, etc.]. Our internal capacity to support this is [TEAM AND BUDGET CONSTRAINTS]. The partner's track record and reputation is [WHAT YOU KNOW ABOUT THEIR STABILITY, PAST PARTNERSHIPS, FINANCIAL HEALTH]. The strategic goal this partnership is supposed to serve is [SPECIFIC GOAL, e.g. "enter the EU market" or "add enterprise-grade security certification"]. The decision needs to be made by [DEADLINE]. Task: Produce a go/no-go recommendation memo. Identify the three to five biggest risks this specific deal carries (not generic partnership risks), weight each by likelihood and impact, and state what would have to be true for this partnership to actually move the needle on the stated strategic goal versus just consuming internal resources and creating an exit headache later. Include a specific “walk away” trigger — a concrete, observable signal that would tell us six months in that this partnership isn't working and we should exit cleanly rather than keep extending it on hope. Constraints: - Do not default to a “yes, with conditions” recommendation just because that's the diplomatically safest answer — if the deal is weak, say no-go clearly. - Weigh the opportunity cost of the internal resources this partnership would consume against other uses of that same capacity, not just the deal's own merits in isolation. - Flag any dependency risk explicitly — what happens to us if the partner is acquired, pivots, or shuts down within 18 months. - Do not treat the partner's stated intentions as the same thing as contractual protection; call out where the deal relies on goodwill instead of enforceable terms. - Keep the recommendation to one clear verdict (Go / No-Go / Go with specific renegotiated terms) — no hedged "it depends" conclusions. Output Format: ## Recommendation One paragraph: the verdict, stated plainly, and the single biggest reason behind it. ## Risk Matrix A table: Risk | Likelihood (Low/Medium/High) | Impact (Low/Medium/High) | Mitigation or Why It Can't Be Mitigated. ## What Would Have to Be True 3-4 bullets describing the conditions under which this deal actually achieves the stated strategic goal. ## Exit Trigger One concrete, observable signal and a specific timeframe for re-evaluating or walking away.
Result
Recommendation
Go, but only with renegotiated terms — specifically, remove the 12-month marketplace exclusivity clause and replace it with a 90-day initial term with an opt-in renewal. The upside (marketplace visibility, co-marketing reach) is real, but the current structure asks you to lock out every other distribution partner for a full year based on nothing but the platform's own volume projections, which you have no way to verify until after you've already signed away the optionality.
Risk Matrix
| Risk | Likelihood | Impact | Mitigation or Why It Can't Be Mitigated |
|---|---|---|---|
| Exclusivity blocks a better deal from a competing platform mid-term | Medium | High | Cannot be fully mitigated under current terms — only fixable by shortening the exclusivity window or adding a performance-based exit clause. |
| Referral volume underperforms the platform's pitch-deck projections | High | Medium | Mitigate by requesting 60 days of their anonymized historical referral data for comparable partners before signing, not just their forward projection. |
| Platform is itself an acquisition target in a consolidating market | Medium | High | Cannot be mitigated by contract terms alone; build an explicit transition clause into the agreement for what happens to committed placements if ownership changes. |
| Co-marketing commitment consumes marketing bandwidth already allocated to Q1 campaigns | High | Medium | Mitigate by capping the internal hours commitment in the contract itself, not as an informal understanding. |
What Would Have to Be True
- The platform's referral volume needs to materialize within the first 90 days, not “ramp up over the year” — a slow ramp is usually a sign the fit isn't there.
- The marketplace placement needs to drive leads that convert at a rate comparable to your existing channels, not just impressions or clicks.
- The internal hours spent on co-marketing need to come from genuinely idle capacity, not capacity diverted from a higher-priority Q1 initiative.
- The exclusivity, if kept at all, needs to be short enough that a wrong bet doesn't cost you a full year of alternative distribution options.
Exit Trigger
If qualified referral volume from the platform is below 15% of their original pitch-deck projection by day 75, treat that as the signal to let the initial term lapse rather than renew — don't wait for a full year of “it might still pick up” to make that call, because the opportunity cost of the exclusivity compounds the entire time you wait.
Partnership proposals almost never get killed cleanly. They get “paused,” “revisited next quarter,” or quietly renewed because unwinding a live co-marketing commitment feels more disruptive than just extending it — even when the deal stopped making sense months ago. The Partnership Due Diligence Brief exists to force the harder, earlier conversation: a structured risk-weighted recommendation before signatures happen, not a retroactive postmortem after the exit costs have already piled up.
Why the recommendation has to be a single verdict, not a hedge
Business advisors default to “yes, with conditions” because it's the diplomatically safest answer — it avoids the political cost of killing someone's deal. The prompt explicitly bans that hedge. Forcing a clean Go, No-Go, or Go-with-renegotiated-terms verdict means the model has to actually commit to a position instead of listing considerations and leaving the decision to the reader, which is usually how weak deals survive internal review.
Why risk has to be weighted, not just listed
Every partnership proposal comes with a generic list of risks that sound serious but carry no actual information — “execution risk,” “market risk,” “key person risk.” The Risk Matrix forces likelihood and impact to be scored separately for each risk specific to this deal, which surfaces the real differentiator: a high-likelihood, high-impact risk with no mitigation path should sink a deal that a low-likelihood, low-impact risk never would, even if both appear on the same bullet list.
Why the prompt demands an exit trigger before the deal is signed
Most partnerships that should have ended didn't have a predefined failure condition — they just kept getting extended because no one had agreed in advance on what “not working” would look like. Asking for one concrete, observable signal and a specific timeframe moves the decision about whether to exit from a political judgment call made under sunk-cost pressure to a pre-agreed, objective checkpoint.
Why opportunity cost is a required input, not an afterthought
A partnership can look reasonable evaluated purely on its own merits and still be the wrong call, because the internal resources it consumes — engineering hours, marketing bandwidth, executive attention — have a cost even if the deal itself never actively fails. The constraint requiring the model to weigh that capacity against other uses prevents the common failure mode of approving a mediocre partnership simply because nothing about it looks obviously bad in isolation.
Using this prompt well
The quality of the recommendation depends entirely on how honestly you fill in the internal capacity and partner track-record fields — if you understate your team's existing workload or overstate the partner's stability to make the deal look more attractive, the model will produce a confident recommendation built on a false premise. Fill those fields in the way you'd want a skeptical board member to see them, not the way you'd want to pitch the deal.